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Abstract
We interpret the Leggett-Garg (LG) inequality as a kind of contextual
probabilistic inequality in which one combines data collected in experi-
ments performed for three different contexts. In the original version of the
inequality these contexts have the temporal nature and they are given by
three pairs of instances of time, (t1, t2), (t2, t3), (t3, t4), where t1 < t2 < t3.
We generalize LG conditions of macroscopic realism and noninvasive mea-
surability in the general contextual framework. Our formulation is done
in the purely probabilistic terms: existence of the context independent
joint probability distribution P and the possibility to reconstruct the ex-
perimentally found marginal (two dimensional) probability distributions
from the P. We derive an analog of the LG inequality, “contextual LG
inequality”, and use it as a test of “quantum-likeness” of statistical data
collected in a series of experiments on recognition of ambiguous figures. In
our experimental study the figure under recognition is the Schro¨der stair
which is shown with rotations for different angles. Contexts are encoded
by dynamics of rotations: clockwise, anticlockwise, and random. Our data
demonstrated violation of the contextual LG inequality for some combi-
nations of aforementioned contexts. Since in quantum theory and exper-
iments with quantum physical systems this inequality is violated, e.g., in
the form of the original LG-inequality, our result can be interpreted as
a sign that the quantum(-like) models can provide a more adequate de-
scription of the data generated in the process of recognition of ambiguous
figures.
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1 Introduction
Mathematical modeling of the process of recognition of ambiguous figures
is an intriguing problem which still has no completely satisfactory solution.
Recently quantum(-like) models based on the mathematical formalism of
quantum mechanics and its generalizations were applied to this problem
[1]–[12]. As in any mathematical modeling project, the output of models
has to be compared with results of experiments.
One of the basic intrinsically quantum probabilistic effects is violation
of the formula of total probability which is experimentally exhibited in the
interference effect [6]–[8]. In a series of papers [1]–[3] such an effect was
found in experimental data collected in sequential recognition of a pair
of ambiguous figures. Then it was also found [4] that these data violate
Bell’s inequality [5].
Another quantum-like study on recognition of ambiguous figures was
done by Atmanspacher et al. [10], [11] a quantum-like model of bistable
perception. (A generalized quantum formalism was in use [12].) One
of the important novelties in [10], [11] was application of temporal Bell
inequalities, concretely the Leggett-Garg (LG) inequality [13].
Recently a quantum-like model of recognition of ambiguous figures was
presented in the paper of Asano et al. [14]. The model matches very well
with experimental data on determination of the structure of the Schro¨der
stair which was shown with rotations for different angles.
In this paper we consider the possibility to use the inequalities of the
LG type to check “quantum-likeness” of statistical data collected [14] in
experimental studies on bistable perception. We interpret the LG inequal-
ity as a kind of contextual probabilistic inequality in which one combines
data collected in experiments performed for three different contexts, cf.
[9], [6], [10], [15], [8]. In the original version of the inequality these contexts
have the temporal nature and they are given by three pairs of instances of
time, (t1, t2), (t2, t3), (t3, t4), where t1 < t2 < t3. We generalize LG condi-
tions of macroscopic realism and noninvasive measurability in the general
contextual framework. Our formulation is done in purely probabilistic
terms: existence of the context independent joint probability distribution
P and the possibility to reconstruct the experimentally found marginal
(two dimensional) probability distributions from the P.We derive an ana-
log of the LG inequality, “contextual LG inequality”, and use it as a test of
“quantum-likeness” of statistical data collected in a series of experiments
on recognition of ambiguous figures. In our experimental study the figure
under recognition is the Schro¨der stair [16] which is shown with rota-
tions for different angles. Contexts are encoded by dynamics of rotations:
clockwise, anticlockwise, and random. Our data demonstrated violation
of the contextual LG inequality for some combinations of aforementioned
contexts. Since in quantum theory and experiments with quantum phys-
ical systems this inequality is violated, e.g., in the form of the original
LG-inequality (see, e.g., [17] and references hereby), our result can be
interpreted as a sign that the quantum(-like) models can provide a more
adequate description of the data generated in the process of recognition
of ambiguous figures.
In probabilistic terms context dependence of (probabilistically deter-
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mined) mental states imply that the conventional model of probability
theory, the Kolmogorov measure-theoretic model [18], cannot be applied
to describe statistics of recognition of ambiguous figures. Thus our re-
sult on violation of the contextual LG inequality restricts the domain of
applications of the Kolmogorov model1. More general probabilistic mod-
els have to be tested, e.g., quantum probability and its generalizations
[12], [6], [19]. Since neither physicists nor psychologists have a proper
education in probability theory, at least in the axiomatic approach, we
complete this paper with an extended appendix presenting both a brief
introduction to the classical Kolmogorov model and a discussion on pos-
sible non-Kolmogorovian generalizations as well as relation to Bell type
inequalities.
Contextuality of mental representations is one of the fundamental fea-
tures of cognition. In particular, mental contextuality is one of the main
motivations for applications of the quantum formalism to modeling of cog-
nition [6],[19]–[24], [14] and more generally biological information process-
ing2 [25], [26], since quantum mechanics is also fundamentally contextual.
Typically quantum contextuality is expressed in the form of the Kochen-
Specker theorem. However, recently contextuality was also represented
with the aid of Bell type inequalities, e.g., [27]. These recent theoreti-
cal and experimental results on the Bell type expression of contextuality
match well with the contextual approach to the problem of violation of
Bell’s inequalities developed by one of the authors of this paper [9], [28]–
[30], see also [31]–[39]. Originally Bell mixed in one cocktail nonlocality
and realism. The standard conclusion from violation of the inequalities
of the CHSH-type is that “local realism” is incompatible with quantum
behavior is not easy to interpret. What is the problem? Nonlocality?
Realism? Both? The contextual viewpoint to violation of Bell type (so to
say, spatial) inequalities helps a lot to clarify this problem. The contex-
tual (spatial) Bell inequality is violated for a single particle, e.g., a neutron
[27], therefore the problem of (non)locality can be automatically excluded
from consideration. The same happens in the case of temporal contex-
tual Bell inequalities, including the LG inequality. We shall come back
to this discussion and extend it to the problem of inter-relation of men-
tal contextuality and mental realism in sections 2.1, 7. (We also remark
that T. Nieuwenhuizen invented the terminology Contextuality Loophole
summarizing outputs of studies [31], [9], [28]–[30], [32]-[36].)
We point out that contextual dependent systems (in physics, biology,
economics, finances, and social science) and non-Kolmogorov probability
theory can be described mathematically [19], [8] by the adaptive dynamics
and the operation of lifting (the latter is widely used in quantum infor-
mation theory [40]).
It is important to remark that we consider contextuality in its the most
general form, as N. Bohr [41] did: the whole experimental arrangement
has to be taken into account. J. Bell [5] considered only a very special
1In fact, the real situation is more complicated, see section 8.4.
2The formal identity of quantum-like models of “decision making” by cells and cognitive
systems can be considered as an argument for recognition of existing of a kind of cell’s cogni-
tion.
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form of contextuality: dependence of the result of measurement of some
observable A on joint measurement of another observable B compatible
with A. In cognitive science the situation is even trickier. Measurements
are typically self-observations which the brain performs on itself. There-
fore “the whole experimental arrangement” includes not only the “exter-
nal experimental arrangemenet”, e.g., prepared by researchers in cognitive
psychology, but also “internal arrangement” including the brain state.
We remark that this paper has nothing to do with study of quantum
physical processes in the brain. We proceed with the operational approach
to quantum theory as a formalism describing in probabilistic terms mea-
surements of in general incompatible observables. Such observables can
be of any nature, physical, mental, biological [6], [19].
2 Leggett-Garg inequality
2.1 Conditions of derivation
At the beginning of the discussion in the paper [13], Leggett and Garg
(LG) postulated the following two assumptions:
(A1) Macroscopic realism: A macroscopic system with two or more
macroscopically distinct states available to it will at all times be in
one or the other of these states.
(A2) Noninvasive measurability: It is possible, in principle, to deter-
mine the state of the system without arbitrarily small perturbation
on its subsequent dynamics.
Under these assumptions, the correlation functions must satisfy the LG
inequality which will be presented in the next section. However, quantum
mechanics violates the LG inequality as well as the same analogue of
Bell’s inequality or CHSH inequality. Therefore this violation means that
at least one of the two assumptions fails for quantum systems.
Although in the derivation of the LG inequality, section 3, both condi-
tions play important roles, their foundational value is different. The main
issue is realism, whether one can still proceed with (A1), macroscopic re-
alism, in the quantum world. Therefore the main part of the LG paper
[13] is devoted to discussion about possible physical experimental schemes
which may lead to noninvasive measurements or at least measurements in
which invasiveness is small comparing with the degree of violation of the
LG inequality. There are claims, e.g., the experiment in [17], that such
negligibly invasive measurements were performed experimentally and the
LG inequality was violated. This is often seen as an important argument
in favor of non-objectivity of quantum observables.
However, the LG approach plays an important foundational role even
if the possibility that measurements are non-negligibly invasive cannot be
excluded. We know that classical systems and measurements on such sys-
tems satisfy conditions (A1) and (A2); e.g., airplane’s trajectory. There-
fore by violating LG we at least know that a phenomenon under study
cannot be described classically.
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In cognitive science it is not easy (if possible at all) to come with an
experimental scheme which would lead to (at least approximately) non-
invasive measurements. The brain is a kind of self-measurement device,
by giving an answer to a question the brain definitely perturbs its men-
tal state and non-negligibly. And the introspective measurements have
definitely the lowest degree of non-invasiveness. Therefore it seems that
violations of the LG type inequalities for data collected, e.g., in cognitive
psychology, cannot lead to the conclusion that mental realism is ques-
tionable. Here realism is understood in the sense of objectivity of mental
observables, that their values can be assigned, say to the brain, a pri-
ori, i.e., before measurements. Nevertheless, such violations show that
the data under consideration is nonclassical, i.e., it is not similar to data
collected, e.g., from an ensemble of moving airplanes.
However, our main point is that in relation to the problem of cognition
the standard physical viewpoint on conditions for derivation of the LG in-
equality, namely, the mixture of macrorealism and non-invasiveness, does
not match so well with the mental situation. As was emphasized, the very
notion of (non)invasive measurement loses its clearness for self-measuring
devices and the brain is one of such devices. The paper advertises the
contextual viewpoint on the mental phenomena developed in the series of
works [6],[19]–[24], [14]. It seems that Bell type inequalities, including the
temporal ones, can be used to distinguish contextual and non-contextual
realism and more generally (since mental processes are fundamentally ran-
dom) contextual and non-contextual probabilistic representations. As will
be seen from coming presentation, non-contextuality of representation of
probabilistic data implies constraints on such data, in the form of various
inequalities. By using contextual representation a system (including the
brain) can violate such constraints. We shall come back to this discussion
in section 7.
3 Contextual viewpoint on the proof of
LG inequality
To provide to a reader the possibility to compare the original LG inequal-
ity with our contextual generalization, see section 4, and at the same time
to add the contextual flavor to the LG approach, we present the original
LG derivation by considering time as a context parameter.
Let Q be an observable quantity which takes either +1 or −1. In the
original discussion by LG, Q is the observable of position of a particle in
the two potential wells. However we can discuss another two-level system,
e.g. spin- 1
2
system.
The measurement of the two-level system is perfomed on a single sys-
tem at different times t1 < t2 < t3. We denote the observable at time tk
by Qk (k = 1, 2, 3). By repeating a series of three measurements, we can
estimate the value of correlation functions by
Cij =
1
N
N∑
n=1
q
(n)
i q
(n)
j ,
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where q
(n)
i (or q
(n)
j ) is a result of the n-th measurement of Qi (or Qj).
Note that the correlation between Qi and Qj takes the maximum value
Cij = 1 when q
(n)
i q
(n)
j equals to 1 for all the repeated trials. Here, consider
the assumption A1, then the state of the system is determined at all times
even when the measurement does not perform on the system. Therefore,
the values of joint probabilities of Q1, Q2 and Q3 are determined a priori
at initial time t0. We denote it by the symbol Pi,j (Q1, Q2, Q3). Remark
that the pairs of indexes i, j encode the situation that only two observables
Qi and Qj are measured. In other words, the joint probability depends on
the situations which pairs of observables are measured. (We can consider
pairs of indexes, instances of time, as parameters encoding three temporal
contexts, Ct1t2 , Ct1t3 , Ct2t3 , cf. section 4.) However if one considers (A2),
then the joint probabilities do not depend on temporal contexts3:
Pi,j (Q1, Q2, Q3) = P (Q1, Q2, Q3) ∀i, j
Then we have the following equalities:
P (Q1, Q2) =
∑
Q3=±1
P (Q1, Q2, Q3) ,
P (Q2, Q3) =
∑
Q1=±1
P (Q1, Q2, Q3) ,
P (Q1, Q3) =
∑
Q2=±1
P (Q1, Q2, Q3)
which are consequences of the additivity of classical (Kolmogorov) prob-
ability. Thus pairwise joint probability distributions are context indepen-
dent (as a consequence of (A2)). We also have
P (Q1) =
∑
Q2=±1
P (Q1, Q2) =
∑
Q3=±1
P (Q1, Q3) ; (1)
P (Q2) =
∑
Q1=±1
P (Q1, Q2) =
∑
Q3=±1
P (Q2, Q3) ; (2)
P (Q3) =
∑
Q1=±1
P (Q1, Q3) =
∑
Q2=±1
P (Q2, Q3) ; (3)
Thus, for each observable, its probability distribution is also context in-
dependent (as a consequence of (A2)). Violation of these equalities is
interpreted as exhibition of contextuality. In psychology and cognitive sci-
ence the equalities (1)–(3) represent the special case of so-called marginal
selectivity [37]–[39]. It is clear that if at least one of these equalities is
violated then one cannot assume existence of context independent joint
probability distribution.
3We remark that conditions (A1) and (A2) were formulated in the physical framework.
Therefore any study about the LG-inequality performed at the mathematical level of rigor-
ousness has to present some mathematical formalization of these conditions. In our study (A1)
and (A2) imply that there exists the joint probability distribution which does not depend on
experimental contexts. In particular, we identify (A2) with noncontextuality. We understand
well that this is not the only possible probabilistic interpretation of (A1) and (A2).
6
Under the assumption of existence of the joint (triple) probability dis-
tribution the correlation functions are written with the joint probabilities
P (Qi, Qj) as
Cij = P (Qi = 1, Qj = 1) + P (Qi = −1, Qj = −1)
− P (Qi = −1, Qj = 1) − P (Qi = 1, Qj = −1)
= 2 {P (Qi = 1, Qj = 1) + P (Qi = −1, Qj = −1)} − 1.
We set K = C12 +C23−C13. It can be represented in the following form:
K = 1−4 {P (Q1 = 1, Q2 = −1, Q3 = 1) + P (Q1 = −1, Q2 = 1, Q3 = −1)}
(4)
This representation implies the LG-inequality:
K ≤ 1. (5)
As we know, e.g., [13], [17] for the quantum correlation functions Cij the
above inequality can be violated (theoretically and experimentally)
4 Contextual LG inequality
Here, we express the LG’s assumptions in terms of context-dependent
probabilities [9]. We remark that in general context-dependent proba-
bilities cannot be represented in common Kolmogorov probability space.
Therefore one can consider such contextual probabilistic models as non-
Komogorovian probabilistic models, see the appendix.
(A1) There exists a joint probability PC (Q1, Q2, Q3) under a certain con-
diton of experiments (context) C. And the Kolmogorovness of PC (Q1, Q2, Q3)
is ensured within the context C:
PC (Q1, Q2) =
∑
Q3=±1
PC (Q1, Q2, Q3) ,
PC (Q2, Q3) =
∑
Q1=±1
PC (Q1, Q2, Q3) ,
PC (Q1, Q3) =
∑
Q2=±1
PC (Q1, Q2, Q3) ,
and
PC (Q1) =
∑
Q2=±1
PC (Q1, Q2) =
∑
Q3=±1
PC (Q1, Q3) =
∑
Q2=±1
∑
Q3=±1
PC (Q1, Q2, Q3) ,
PC (Q2) =
∑
Q1=±1
PC (Q1, Q2) =
∑
Q3=±1
PC (Q2, Q3) =
∑
Q1=±1
∑
Q3=±1
PC (Q1, Q2, Q3) ,
PC (Q3) =
∑
Q2=±1
PC (Q2, Q3) =
∑
Q1=±1
PC (Q1, Q3) =
∑
Q1=±1
∑
Q2=±1
PC (Q1, Q2, Q3) .
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(A2) Consider three different contexts CA, CB and CC , then there exists a
context C unifying the above contexts CA, CB and CC such that
PCA (Q1, Q2) =
∑
Q3=±1
PC (Q1, Q2, Q3) ,
PCB (Q2, Q3) =
∑
Q1=±1
PC (Q1, Q2, Q3) ,
PCC (Q1, Q3) =
∑
Q2=±1
PC (Q1, Q2, Q3) .
From these assumptions, one can obtain the inequality (4) for K given
by
K = 1−4(PC (Q1 = 1, Q2 = −1, Q3 = 1)+PC (Q1 = −1, Q2 = 1, Q3 = −1)).
(6)
5 Violation of inequality in optical illu-
sions
The Schro¨der’s stair is an ambiguous figure which induces optical illusion[16,
42], see the Fig. 1. Our brain can switch between the two alternative in-
terpretations of this figure:
(i) The surface of ‘L’ is front, and the surface of ‘R’ is back.
(ii) The surface of ‘R’ is front, and the surface of ‘L’ is back.
This switch-like process of human perception is called depth inversion,
and many experimental proofs on this phenomenon have been reported.
However, the details of its mechanism is not completely figured out even
in recent studies.
It is well-known fact that the depth inversion depends on various con-
texts of figure; e.g. relative size of the surface ‘L’ for ‘R’, color or shadow
in figure, angle to the horizon, etc.[42]. Therefore we must define the
contextual dependent probability that a person answers either (i) or (ii)
in the experiment.
Figure 1: Schro¨der’s stair leaning at angle θ
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Now we explain the method of our experiment, and we show its results.
We show the subjects the picture of Schro¨der’s stair which is leaning at a
certain angle θ (see Fig. 1). We prepare the 11 pictures which are leaning
at different angles: θ = 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 45, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90. A subject
must answer either (i)“L is front” or (ii)“R is front” for every picture. We
arrange the computer experiment to change the pictures and to record
their answers.
Before the experiment, we divided the subjects into three groups: (A)
55 persons, (B) 48 persons, (C) 48 persons.4 For the first group (A),
the order of showing is randomly selected for each person. To assume
statistically uniform randomness of this selection, we use the computer-
implemented function (e.g. java.rand). For the second group (B), the
angle θ is increased from a small value: 0, 10, · · · , 90. Inversely, for the
third group (C), the angle θ is decreased from a large value: 90, 80, · · · , 0.
Thus we have the three kinds of experimental data: (A) the angle
of Schro¨der stair changes randomly, (B) from 0 to 90, (C) from 90 to 0.
These contexs of experiments are denoted by CA, CB and CC . Let Xθ be a
random variable which takes ±1. The event that a subject says ”left side
is front” corresponds to the result Xθ = +1. Then, from the repeated
trials for each experimental context, we have the experimentally obtained
values of joint probabilities:
PCA (X0, X10, · · · , X90) , PCB (X0, X10, · · · , X90) , PCC (X0, X10, · · · , X90) .
The correlation functions is given by
C12 = 2 {PX (Xθ1 = 1, Xθ2 = 1) + PX (Xθ1 = −1, Xθ2 = −1)} − 1,
C23 = 2 {PY (Xθ2 = 1, Xθ3 = 1) + PY (Xθ2 = −1, Xθ3 = −1)} − 1,
C13 = 2 {PZ (Xθ1 = 1, Xθ3 = 1) + PZ (Xθ1 = −1, Xθ3 = −1)} − 1.
Here, the triple (X ,Y,Z) is given by a combination of the contexts CA, CB
and CC . We show the values of C12, C23 and C13 in the Table XX
C12 C23 C13
CA 1.000 0.964 0.964
CB 0.917 0.833 0.750
CC 0.917 1.000 1.000
C12 C23 C13
CA 0.091 0.091 0.127
CB 0.375 0.625 0.083
CC 0.625 0.375 0.167
(Left) (θ1, θ2, θ3) = (0, 10, 20) (Right) (θ1, θ2, θ3) = (40, 45, 50)
We estimate the LHS of the inequality:
K(θ1, θ2, θ3) = C12 +C23 − C13.
4We randomly selected the 151 participants from the students of Tokyo University of
Science. And randomly divided this sample into three aforementioned groups. We showed a
suite of 11 pictures to each subject with a laptop computer. Usually the distance between
eyes and screen is 20 cm 30 cm. He or she typed a key corresponding to answer L or R.
We did not limited time to answer, so that the subject had enough time to make his or her
decision. We implemented java application in order to show the pictures and to record their
answers. The order of showing in random case can be selected by software (not manually).
All the records are saved as the output CSV file.
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Table YY shows that the value of K with respect to the (θ1, θ2, θ3) =
(0, 10, 20) and (40, 45, 50). The value of K exceeding one is seen in several
cases.
X ,Y,Z CA, CA CA, CB CA, CC CB, CA CB, CB CB, CC CC , CA CC , CB CC , CC
CA 1.000 1.214 1.047 0.870 1.083 0.917 1.036 1.250 1.083
CB 0.917 1.130 0.964 0.786 1.000 0.833 0.953 1.167 1.000
CC 0.917 1.130 0.964 0.786 1.000 0.833 0.953 1.167 1.000
Table 1: the triple of angles (0, 10, 20) . The values of K for various
combinations of contexts. For the contexts (CA, CC , CB) , K approaches
its maximal value.
X ,Y,Z CA, CA CA, CB CA, CC CB, CA CB, CB CB, CC CC , CA CC , CB CC , CC
CA 0.055 0.099 0.015 0.589 0.633 0.549 0.339 0.383 0.299
CB 0.339 0.383 0.299 0.873 0.917 0.833 0.623 0.667 0.583
CC 0.589 0.633 0.549 1.123 1.167 1.083 0.873 0.917 0.833
Table 2: the triple of angles (40, 45, 50) . The values of K for various
combinations of contexts. For the contexts (CC , CB, CB) , K approaches
its maximal value.
6 Statistical analysis
We start from the random variable:
K = Q1Q2 +Q2Q3 −Q1Q3
Here, K takes −4,−2, 0 or +3 since Qi takes +1 or −1. The probability
distribution of K is not known, but it has mean value µ and variance σ2
and their statistical estimates can be found. To find the confidence inter-
val in such a situation, we apply the simplest method of nonparametric
statistics, namely, the method based on the Chebyshev inequality. (How-
ever, from the very beginning we remark that this method gives us only
rough estimate for the confidence interval.) This method was recently used
[43] for analysis of statistical data from the Vienna-test for the Bell-type
inequality, the Eberhard inequality, which finally closed the fair sampling
loophole. In this test, because of the presence of slight drift depending on
experimental setting, one cannot assume Gaussianity of data and it seems
that usage of the Chebyshev inequality is the simplest way to resolve this
problem.
We can apply the Chebyshev inequality to sample mean of K
P (|m− µ| > c) ≤
σ2
nc2
with positive constant c. Here,m is a sample mean of independent random
variables K1, ..., Kn:
m =
K1 +K2 + ...+Kn
n
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Although we do not know the value of σ2, we can estimate σ2 with unbi-
ased sample variance. Then µ is estimated by m with confidence interval
[m− c,m+ c].
We take the 80% confidence level. In the case that the order of the
contexts is (X ,Y,Z) = (CA, CC , CB), and the angle θ = 0, 10, 20 (This
case is maximum value of K) , we estimate the value of K as follows.
K = 1.250 ± 0.213
Statistical analysis shows that the violation of the LG-inequality is sta-
tistically significant. However, it is clear that one has to perform better
experiments to get a higher level of violation. The main problem of the
present experiment is that the sample is not large enough. It seems that
this will be the problem of all Bell-type tests in cognitive science. All
such inequalities are based on correlations, so samples of students have
to be sufficiently large: to calculate correlations (this needs human re-
courses)and get statistically significant violation (additional human re-
course) of the corresponding inequality for such correlations.
7 Concluding remarks
A violation of the contextual LG inequality by statistical data collected
for observations of the Schro¨der stair rotated for different angles supports
the contextual cognition paradigm presented in the series of works [6],[19]–
[24], [14]. Our experimental statistical data is fundamentally contextual.5
The brain does not have a priori prepared “answers” to the question about
the R/L structure of the Schro¨der stair for the fixed angle θ. Answers are
generated depending on the mental context. Thus mental realism is a
kind of contextual realism, cf. [30]. There are practically no (at least not
so many), so to say, “absolute mental quantities”, “answers” to the same
question vary essentially depending on context. This conclusion is not
surprising in the framework of cognitive science and psychology, where
various framing effects are well known. Thus the main contribution of
this paper is the demonstration of applicability of a statistical test of
5In fact, it violates even condition of marginal selectivity. We interpret violation of marginal
selectivity as one of signs of contextuality. Of course, it is important to approach violation
of the LG-inequality in combination with marginal selectivity. And this is a delicate issue.
Up to authors’ knowledge, even in physics the experimental situation is not completely clear.
Practically all publications on violation of the Bell-type inequalities represent only the values
of correlations (or even only the values of their linear combinations) and it is impossible
to check condition of marginal selectivity. Only two authors, A. Aspect (in his PhD-thesis
[45]) and G. Weihs (open source, which was later removed), presented count-data for which
it is possible to check marginal selectivity. And (surprisingly) this condition is violated [46].
Thus the question whether in physics combination of violation of the Bell-type inequalities and
marginal selectivity was approached is open (mainly because experimental groups do not want
to share count-data). We can speculate that in physics marginal selectivity would be never
approached, at least in combination with violation of the Bell-type inequalities. Marginal
distributions would always depend on experimental settings. However, the degree of such
dependence can be considered as “sufficiently small comparing with the degree of violation of
the corresponding inequality.” Of course, the latter statement has to be presented in terms
of statistical analysis.
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contextuality borrowed from quantum physics. We also can consider this
study as a step towards creation of unified mathematical picture of the
world: physical and mental phenomena can be described by the same
equations, cf. [6].
Such studies on usage of the standard quantum mechanical tests in
other domains of science also contribute to foundations of quantum physics,
since they can be used as at least indirect arguments supporting some in-
terpretations of outputs of these tests for physical systems. In our case,
the viewpoint that contextuality and not nonlocality is the basic source of
nonclassical probabilistic behavior of cognitive systems, see also [44], may
be used to support local contextual models of quantum physical phenom-
ena.
8 Appendix: Kolmogorov probability model
and Bell type inequalities
8.1 Kolmogorov axiomatics, probability space
We start this section with rather long introduction to the classical measure-
theoretic model of probability theory[18]. Our aim is to show that the
problem of construction of common probability measure was one of the
basic problems even in classical probability theory, namely, invention
of stochastic processes was based on such a special construction (Kol-
mogorov’s theorem [18]). Positive solution of this problem in the case
of stochastic processes played an important role in the formation of the
present ideology of classical probability: observables have to be repre-
sented by random variables on common probability space. However, in
the case of quantum observables this is not true.
Classical probability theory is based on the model of A. N. Kolmogorov
[18]. Its basic notion is probability space, a triple P = (Ω,F , P ), where
Ω is a set, P is a probability measure, and F is a collection of subsets of
Ω on which probability is defined.6 In the Kolmogorovean model [18] an
observable, say a, is represented by a random variable7: a map a : Ω→ R
such that, for each interval, its pre-image, {ω ∈ Ω : a(ω) ∈ [α, β)}, belongs
to F . Its the probability distribution is defined as pa(A) = P (ω : a(ω) ∈
A).
A system of observables is represented by a vector of random variables
a = (a1, ..., an). Its probability distribution is defined as
pa(A1 × · · · × An) = P (ω : a1(ω) ∈ A1, · · · , an(ω) ∈ An). (7)
6This is a σ-algebra (“σ-field”): a system of sets which is closed with respect to countable
unions, intersections, and the operation of complement.
7We remark that the Kolmogorovean model is not simply a mathematical theory. In
the same way as the Euclidean model provided mathematical formalization of geometry of
physical space, the Kolmogorovean model provided mathematical formalization of the theory
of measurements of random variables. Euclid formalized such heuristic notions as point,
straight line, plane, angle...; Kolmogorov formalized such notions as event, probability, random
observable (=random variable). In section 8.3 we shall come back to comparison of the roles
played by the Euclidean model of geometry of space and the Kolmogorovean model of random
measurements in physics.
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The notion of a random vector is generalized to the notion of a stochas-
tic process. Suppose that the set of indexes is infinite; for example,
at, t ∈ [0,+∞). Suppose that, for each finite set (t1...tk), the vector
(at1 ...atk ) can be observed and its probability distribution pt1...tk is given.
By selecting Ωt1...tk = R
k, Pt1...tk = pt1...tk , and F as the Borel σ-algebra,
we obtain the probability space Pt1...tk describing measurements at points
t1...tk. At the beginning of 20th century the main mathematical question
of probability theory was whether it is possible to find a single probability
space P = (Ω,F , P ) such that all at be represented as random variables
on this space and all probability distributions pt1...tk are induced by the
same P :
pt1...tk(A1 × · · · × Ak) = P (ω ∈ Ω : at1(ω) ∈ A1, , atn(ω) ∈ An).
Kolmogorov found natural conditions for the system of measures pt1...tk
which guarantee existence of such a probability space, see [18].8 And
during the next 80 years analysis of properties of (finite and infinite)
families of random variables defined on one fixed probability space was
the main activity in probability theory.
8.2 Kolmogorovean formalization of Bell’s argu-
ment
Although J. Bell did not formulate his argument in the terms of a prob-
ability space, the problem of local realism for quantum observables was
formalized in complete accordance with classical probability theory. In
the Bell framework Ω is selected as the set of hidden variables Λ; local
realism is equivalent to mathematical presentation of observables by ran-
dom variables λ → aα(λ), bβ(λ). Here aα, α = α1, α2, are observables
depending on the parameter α, experimental settings, at “Alice’s lab”
and bβ, β = β1, β2, are observables depending on the parameter β, exper-
imental settings, at “Bob’s lab”. In the framework of the Kolmogorov
probability model the Bell inequality is a theorem. A. Fine rigorously
proved [47] that the Bell inequality is satisfied iff the common probability
space for random variables representing quantum observables does exist.
In the LG inequality (which a special form of contextual Bell inequal-
ities) there is a single observable at depending on the time parameter.
Kolmogorovness means that all these observables can be represented by
random variables, λ→ at(λ), on common Kolmogorov probability space.
8.3 Models: (non-)Euclidean geometry and
(non-)Kolmogorovean probability
Although the main stream in classical probability was, so to say, the
“common probability space stream”, we can point to a few attempts to
swim against this stream, e.g., [28], [9], [29], [30] [20], [15], [31]–[39].
8We just remark that the Ω is selected as the set of all trajectories t → ω(t). The random
variable at is defined as at(ω) = ω(t). Construction of the probability measure P serving for
all finite random vectors is mathematically advanced and going back to construction of the
Wiener measure on the space of continuous functions.
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Now we come back to comparison of mathematical formalizations of
geometry of physical space and random observations. Since the work of
Lobachevsky (and Gauss and Boyai), mathematicians understood that
there exist different mathematical possibilities for representation of space
geometry. We remark that already Lobachevsky and Gauss studied the
problem of adequacy of the Euclidean model to physical reality. Lobachevsky
proposed some astronomic tests, Euclidean contra Lobachevsky geome-
tries; in Germany Gauss (who had some administrative obligations to
measurements of land) performed measurement of angles of a huge trian-
gle formed by three mountains. The latter test confirmed that at least
locally we live in Euclidean space. Later Riemann formulated the general
principles of geometry which played the fundamental role in mathematical
representation of Einstein’s general relativity. (Lobachesky geometry was
used in special relativity).
We emphasize that mathematicians understood long before physicists
(who were at that time completely busy with Newtonian physics based
on the Euclidean geometry) that the Euclidean geometry is one of possi-
ble models of space. On the basis of such an experience collected in the
mathematical community physicists were not astonished by the appear-
ance of Minkowski space in special relativity and then (pseudo-)Riemann
space in general relativity. Here the general approach of D. Hilbert on
axiomatization of physics (also known as Hilbert’s sixth problem) was
respected.
Development of mathematical formalization of probability was very
different. Mathematicians (with a few exceptions) did not question the
Kolmogorov axiomatics. The first non-Kolmogorovean model was elabo-
rated in physics as a part of new physical theory – quantum mechanics.
And in classical probability community quantum probability is still not
recognized as a probability theory, but as some exercises in noncommu-
tative algebra. Therefore in probability it is more difficult than it was
in the case of geometry: any mathematical model, including the Kol-
mogorovean model, has a restricted domain of application. Quantum
phenomena simply showed that one special model of probability cannot
be applied. From the viewpoint of Hilbert axiomatization of physics this
is the end of the story, i.e., one need not search additional “explanations”
of non-Kolmogorovness, one simply has to find a new appropriate mathe-
matical model of probability and proceed with such a model. Thus from
such a viewpoint the Bell argument is not about locality and realism, but
about inadequacy of the Kolmogorov model.9 (Mathematical foundation
of non-Kolmogorov probability theory was discussed in the books [9], [40],
[8].)
Let us again make a comparison with geometry. Did Einstein try
to “explain” appearance of (pseudo-)Riemannian geometries in general
9We point out that one of the problems slowing clarification of Bell’s argument is that here
typically probability (both classical and quantum) is not treated in the axiomatic framework.
There is a prejudice that “probability is probability” and it can be understood heurictically
without going to mathematical axiomatization. However, the positive experience of physical
applications of the axiomatic mathematical models of geometry tells us that this is the most
fruitful way even for probabilistic applications. (Nowadays in physics nobody would work in
the framework of “heuristically understandable geometry”.)
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relativity, instead of one special geometry (Euclidean)? Not at all, he
simply identified (pseudo-)Riemannian geometry with physical space.
Thus experimental tests of Bell’s inequality can be considered as tests
of adequacy of the traditional Kolmogorov model to quantum physical
phenomena (cf. with aforementioned Gauss test of the Euclidean model).
Typically adherents of the non-Kolmogorovness viewpoint on viola-
tion of the Bell inequality consider physics (in the spirit of the Hilbert
program of axiomatization of physics) as a collection of mathematical
models formalizing various natural phenomena. From the very beginning
it is assumed that any such a model has a restricted domain of applica-
tions. A physical experiment of which the output cannot be described
by a model under application is considered as a signal for creation of a
new mathematical model, e.g., the Euclidean model could not be used
for special relativity and new non-Euclidean models were explored (the
Lobachevsky in special relativity and pseudo-Riemannian geometries in
general relativity.)
8.4 Reconstructing Kolmogorovness from contex-
tuality
The main message of this paper is that experimental statistical data col-
lected in cognitive science and psychology are fundamentally contextual.
In general for each experimental context data is described by its own
Kolmogorov probability space.10
Is it possible to unify these spaces in some way?
One possibility is to use quantum probability and the formalism of
complex Hilbert space. This is so to say nonclassical unification. Sur-
prisingly it is even possible to unify these probability spaces classically,
i.e., to embed them into single “big Kolmogorov space”! Such classical
unification is based on taking into account randomness of realizations of
contexts. In this “big probability space” the original probabilities appear
as conditional probabilities with respect to various contexts.
The first version of such unification was presented in the paper [48]
(see [49] for better structured presentation), where the probabilistic data
collected in experiments to determine the EPR-Bohm correlations were
10We remark that this was the original viewpoint of Kolmogorov. In second section of
his seminal monograph [18] in which he formulated the axiomatics of classical probability
theory he emphasized the correspondence: experiment → probability space. Unfortunately,
this message of the creator of probability theory was completely forgotten by his followers
who completely ignored multi-space structure of experimental studies, see [53] for the detailed
discussion. Of course, Kolmogorov by himself was excited by the possibility to unify prob-
ability spaces corresponding to measurements of a stochastic process for finite sequences of
instances of time, see section 8.1. One cannot exclude that he was sure that such unification
is possible for any kind of data. Although he had never pointed to such a possibility, some
indirect signs supporting such a hypothesis about his views can be found; in particular, peo-
ple from his close circle reacted very negatively to the attempt of Vorobj’ev [54] to proceed
with multi-space approach in a series of applications – game theory, optimization theory. We
remark that, in particular, Vorobj’ev [54] derived (all possible) Bell type inequalities (for any
number of variables yielding any fixed number of values). He used these inequalities as tests
of Kolmogorovness of probabilistic data.
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embedded into single Kolmogorov probability space. (This construction
is evidently generalized to statistical data collected for any family of ex-
perimental contexts.)11
The reader may ask: Why do you emphasize non-Kolmogorovness in
such a situation?
Although “big Kolmogorov space” unifying data collected for different
contexts exists, it cannot be used so successfully as quantum probability.
The latter describes all possible experimental contexts homogeneously. In
the classical approach based on reconstruction of Kolmogorovness from
contextuality one has to take into account randomness of realizations of
concrete contexts. Of course, one can construct huge Kolmogorov space
unifying all possible contexts and all possible types of randomness for
them. However, it would be practically impossible to work with such
space.
Another problem of the Kolmogorovian unification of contextual ex-
perimental data is that by taking into account randomness of realizations
of contexts (e.g., for the Bell-type experiments, how often each pair of
orientations of polarization beam splitters is realized in the concrete ex-
periment) we lost the internal description of data: experimenter’s “free
will” (to use this or that experimental context for the next trial) also has
to be taken into account. This is a complex interpretation problem related
to construction of “big Kolmogorov spaces”, see [49] for discussion. Quan-
tum mechanics provides description of experimental probabilities without
taking into account randomness of realizations of experimental contexts;
in this sense the quantum description can be treated as a kind of intrin-
sic description. And data can be “intrinsically” Kolmogorovian or non-
Kolmogorovian (although, as we emphasized in this section, it is always
possible to make these data Kolmogorovian “externally”).
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